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Executive Summary 
 The current state of college athletics is a popular debate topic among many Americans. 
Matters of athlete compensation and how large-scale commercialization has undermined 
traditional notions of academic integrity and genuine amateurism are the most common topics 
covered, but I decided to shift the conversation from the NCAA as a whole to the individual 
institutions and conferences that grapple with the same issues. Using the Atlantic Coast 
Conference (ACC) from 1986-2016 as a sample, I wanted to both comprehend how specific 
institutions respond to NCAA sanctions and the way the conference treats previously non-
compliant programs when it undergoes expansion efforts. I created a three-pronged criterion for 
institutional response: senior-level change, lower-level change, or no change. Using my best 
judgment, alongside a bevy of primary sources, I designated which programs experienced 
administrative change.    
 After evaluating all twenty-three cases, clear patterns of violations and sanctions were 
present. Extra benefits and impermissible recruiting were the most popular form of violations 
while probation and public reprimand/censure were the most common penalties levied by the 
NCAA Infractions Committee. However, determining a pattern among institutional responses is 
much more difficult. Despite the overwhelming number of cases that consisted of some 
administrative change, the direct link between violations/sanctions and change in leadership were 
found in only a few instances. High attrition rates are a fact of life for senior-level administrators 
in both academia and athletics; resignations, retirements, new positions in different locales and 
firings exist at all universities. The environment often masks this direct link between sanctions 
and new leadership, a development that should be considered by advocates of athletic reform.       
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Risky Business at Minardi Hall  
In early February, University of Louisville President James Ramsey and Athletic Director 
Tom Jurich decided to self-impose a one-year postseason ban (both conference and national 
tournament) for the men’s basketball team. On first glance, the judgment issued by Ramsey and 
Jurich stunned the city and the national college basketball community given Louisville’s 
impressive record this season. However, the nature of the events led officials to make this 
decision with the hopes of reducing the severity of future punishment (Greer, 2016). In early 
April, Louisville underwent a second phase of self-punishment when they decided to reduce the 
number of scholarships and recruiting visits by both coach Rick Pitino and the rest of his staff.    
At the heart of this punishment were the allegations made by Katina Powell in which she 
described “nearly two dozen stripping and sex parties from 2010 to 2014 inside Billy Minardi 
Hall, the on-campus dorm for athletes and other students.”  Powell told Outside the Lines that 
Andre McGee, a former Cardinals player who was later promoted to director of basketball 
operations, coordinated the parties and “paid her $10,000 for supplying dancers during the time 
period; McGee also allegedly “supplied cash for ‘side deals,’ which included sex with some 
recruits, guardians who accompanied them on visits and some Louisville players.” Five former 
Cardinals players corroborated Powell’s account and McGee’s role in it (Barr and Goodman, 
2015).  
College Sports Scandals and Institutional Responses  
If these allegations at Louisville are found to be true by the NCAA, then there is no 
question that additional punishments will be given. However, to those who have followed 
scandals in college sports, this pattern of bad behavior has largely become routine. 
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Intercollegiate athletics have been mired with scandal and controversy for decades, but it was the 
professionalization of coaches that ushered in this era of commercialization. Beginning with 
Yale crew in 1864, the “saga of the professional coach does much to explode the myth that there 
was ever a lengthy period when the amateur spirit pervaded college athletics” (Smith 1986, 147). 
The state of commercialization in college sports has adapted over time, but programs have 
constantly been looking for ways to gain an advantage over their rivals. In the last decade alone, 
the NCAA has issued sixty five reports of major violations, with thirty-nine of them coming 
from schools in “Power Five” conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and SEC). 
 While so much has been written about the ills of NCAA when it comes to athlete 
compensation and the plethora of scandals rocking colleges and universities across the country, a 
dearth of literature has focused on institutional responses to these scandals. Using the Atlantic 
Coast Conference as an example, I seek to understand the next steps taken by ACC member 
institutions after the NCAA issues reports detailing specific violations and their accompanied 
penalties. Furthermore, with conference expansion as the norm rather than the exception, I also 
will examine new entrants to the ACC over time and determine how conference leadership 
viewed their prior records of rule breaking and whether this impacted their membership to the 
conference.    
Scapegoats and “Keeping up with the Joneses”: Prior Work on Institutional Reactions to 
NCAA Sanctions 
 The primary focus of this paper is to identify potential patterns among institutions in how 
they respond to NCAA sanctions for rules violations, but it warrants mentioning how scholars 
perceive NCAA enforcement and how this perception has evolved over time. 
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NCAA Enforcement in General 
 Scholars initially examined NCAA enforcement for years through the lens of 
emphasizing the system’s numerous flaws. The potential conflict of interests present between 
enforcement staff and the NCAA’s Infraction Committee, questionable protocols for recording 
testimony by investigators, the apparent one-sided nature of the flow of information, and lack of 
sanction consistency were just a few of the issues posed by researchers (Gopelrud, 1991). 
However, the scope later shifted to studying how NCAA enforcement influences competitive 
balance in different sports, specifically football. Researchers using panel data from eleven major 
Division 1 football conferences found that greater levels of enforcement in a conference improve 
competitive balance but the greater severity of punishment reduces competitive balance, thereby 
determining that the net effect of enforcement improves competitive balance (Depken and 
Wilson, 2006).   
 Despite Depken and Wilson’s conclusion of enforcement leading to greater balance 
among programs, many others posit that the NCAA is guilty of practicing “selective 
enforcement,” a process that “targets the least successful schools for investigation while turning 
a blind eye to the most successful institutions because they generate a bulk of the national 
interest, and, therefore, a bulk of the revenue” (Byers quoted in Otto 1995, 40). Yet, others 
propose another iteration of selective enforcement where the NCAA “goes after the most 
successful programs because they attract the most media attention; therefore, they are more 
closely scrutinized” (Zimbalist quoted in Otto 1999, 40).   
The aura of confusion and contradiction surrounding NCAA enforcement leads to 
interesting arguments of due process. This due process argument exists on two planes: the 
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concept of selective enforcement itself and when the actual sanctions are handed down. Cases of 
documented wrongdoing by athletic programs take several years to compile. Once the mandates 
from the Infractions Committee are finally handed down, it adversely impacts athletes who had 
no involvement with the violations outlined by the committee, creating a retroactive system of 
punishment.   
Scapegoats 
 Scapegoating is the practice of assigning blame or undeserved negative treatment to one 
specific individual or group of individuals. Scapegoating occurs in virtually every segment of 
society, but it occupies a special place when it comes to sports. Hallowed discussion of curses 
and jinxes surround teams across the country, especially those teams who have not experienced 
success for a significant amount of time. What should team executives do in this situation? 
Often, they opt for a change in management by firing a head coach or manager, a development 
chronicled by William Gamson and Norman Scotch in 1964.  
Using Major League Baseball managers as their test subjects, Gamson and Scotch 
proposed three explanations for the succession-effectiveness relationship initially articulated by 
Oscar Grusky. The first explanation was designated the common-sense one-way causality theory; 
essentially, the manager understands that his competence is a chief influencer of team 
performance. If the team performs poorly, the manager is ultimately held responsible, dismissed, 
and replaced by another manager with the expectation of raising team performance. Grusky’s 
two-way causality theory also supports the claim that managers greatly influence team 
performance but with reversed repercussions. A change in management “inevitably upsets old 
patterns of behavior” and “new organizational policies produce changes of great magnitude in 
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the internal structure of the team.” Third, the ritual scapegoat no-way causality theory largely 
discounts the impact a manager has on team performance; rather, the talent on the field is the 
most important indicator of success (Gamson and Scotch 1964, 69-70). The issue of 
scapegoating figures largely in assessing institutional responses to NCAA sanctions also. 
Whenever a program is found to have committed recruiting violations or academic dishonesty, 
what is the next step? Do they insulate senior-level officials (head coaches, athletic directors, 
presidents) from blame and sever ties with tutors, advisors, assistant coaches/recruiters or 
acknowledge that accountability is a top-down rather than bottom-up approach? Additionally, 
when these punishments finally go into effect, current players become scapegoats because they 
are negatively impacted by the sins of their predecessors.  
Conspicuous Consumption and “Keeping Up with the Joneses” in College Athletics 
 The American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen is most famous for coining 
the phrase “conspicuous consumption,” which is the behavior of spending money on unnecessary 
luxury goods as a means of displaying apparent affluence (Veblen, 1899). Closely related to 
conspicuous consumption is the idea of “keeping up with the Joneses,” a phenomenon where 
comparing financial success with one’s peers was the key measure of social class: failing to 
“keep up” was (and in most respects, still is) a mark of inferiority. This comparative tool for 
success has been implemented as a means of motivation for university athletics departments for 
decades, but only recently has the extravagant spending by programs gained traction and 
visibility in popular circles.  
 Will Hobson and Steve Rich at the Washington Post requested from athletic departments 
at all 53 public schools affiliated with “Power Five” conferences financial records for 2004 and 
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2014 to chart potential trends in athletics department spending. They found that over this ten-
year period the combined income of all departments nearly doubled to $4.5 billion, but twenty-
five departments still ran a deficit for 2014. Despite the apparent contradiction of unprecedented 
revenues coupled with a substantial number of programs “ending up in the red,” Veblen’s theory 
effectively explains why this is the case. Universities such as Alabama, Texas, Ohio State, and 
Florida are often lumped together as the “1 Percent” of college athletics, but officials at less 
lucrative programs compete in arms races for better facilities and high-quality coaches in order to 
remain competitive with these behemoths. Desire to draw the best recruits and keep the most 
accomplished athletes eligible is another manifestation of “keeping up with the Joneses” among 
athletics departments and can lead to considerable consequences such as NCAA sanctions 
(Hobson and Rich, 2015).                                         
Research Design 
In determining how colleges and universities respond to NCAA sanctions for major 
violations including the improper payment of athletes via monetary/non-monetary benefits and 
instances of academic fraud, I opted for a qualitative approach of analysis with the goal of 
identifying patterns among the studied institutions.     
Data 
 I used the NCAA’s Legislative Services Database for major infractions case searches. 
Dating back to January 1, 1953, this database allows for individuals to search for NCAA reports 
of major violations by individual school, conference, division, penalty type, and sport 
(https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch). I decided to look at just one “Power Five” 
conference, the 15-school Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), over a specific time period (1986-
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2016). I decided to select the ACC because of its large institutional variance and general 
academic superiority when compared to similar conferences. Enrollments range from around 
6,500 at Duke to 41,000 at Florida State with six members being privately affiliated. Moreover, 
most of these schools are often regarded as being some of the nation’s best. This significant 
degree of variation may lead to different plans of action by institutions because of their differing 
missions. However, this intra-conference variation may be overcome by the general 
characteristics (notably athletic facility budgets and administrative compensation) found among 
Power Five conference members when compared to non-Power Five conferences, leading to 
some sense of generalizability.        
The year 1986 is crucial in the history of the NCAA because the Supreme Court recently 
ruled that existing television contracts violated antitrust law. Subsequently, college sports began 
to commercialize at levels never before seen, and I argue that this shift potentially led to coaches 
and other members affiliated with athletic departments to engage in behavior at odds with certain 
NCAA bylaws.   
Methodology  
 After applying parameters for conference and time period to the database, I found that 
ACC member schools had twenty-three major infractions cases. Due to the tumultuous nature of 
conference realignment and for the sake of clarity, I am only including current members of the 
ACC (even if they committed violations while a part of another conference). Because this is a 
qualitative analysis, I will be initially classifying all twenty-three cases based on school, year, 
and sport alongside the most “popular” violations committed by the program and penalties 
imposed by the NCAA. Additionally, I illustrate via primary sources such as media guides how 
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these individual institutions responded to NCAA sanctions. I have created a set of criteria for 
classifying institutional response: change in senior-level administration, change in lower-level 
administration, and accepting the decision and pursuing no further action. Finally, I include 
which schools committed major violations prior to being admitted to the ACC with the goal of 
explaining the potential effect committing major violations has on a program looking to 
“upgrade” conferences. By specifying these schools, I hope to leave readers with a pressing 
question: how much is a conference willing to sacrifice in terms of academic prestige and 
integrity for allowing successful and profitable yet delinquent programs into its ranks? 
Note on Sources 
 Because this particular analysis required quite a bit of personal data collection, I 
consulted available media guides for all ACC member universities that received some NCAA 
sanction report in the established timeline. This allowed me to determine who the head coaches 
were at the time of both the alleged violations and release of NCAA sanction reports. If there 
was a change in leadership, I then cross referenced these names with news articles written at the 
time which would offer a better indicator of whether recently-issued sanctions contributed to this 
change. Regarding university presidents, I consulted individual universities’ “Office of the 
President” webpages which contained lists of past presidents and then conducted the same cross-
referencing procedure. For example, the University of Miami following the 1995 NCAA report 
experienced an administrative shakeup in their football program. Head coaches (two) and athletic 
directors (two) during the time period of the alleged violations (1985-1994) left the university; 
some resigned, others took positions elsewhere. In order to effectively determine what 
specifically led to these changes, I had to consult relevant Miami Herald articles. In terms of 
lower-level changes, the infractions committee directly listed these in the reports because this 
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was often part of the university’s process of self-corrective action prior to the final report being 
released.        
Findings and Discussion 
Table 1: Report Breakdown  
School Year Sport 
Clemson 1990, 1992 FB (1990); MBB (1992) 
Florida State 1996, 2009 FB (1996); FB, MWBB, MT, Base, MWS, MG, Soft (2009)   
 
Georgia Tech 1989, 2005, 2011, 
2014 
MT (1989); FB, MWCC, MWT, MWS (2005); MBB, FB 
(2011); FB, MWBB (2014) 
Louisville 1996, 1998 MBB (1996); MBB, VB (1998) 
Miami 1995, 2003, 2013 FB, WG, Base, MT (1995); Base (2003); FB, MBB (2013) 
North Carolina 2012 FB (2012) 
North Carolina State 1989 MBB (1989)  
Notre Dame 1999 FB (1999) 
Pittsburgh 1993 FB, MBB (1993) 
Syracuse 1992, 2015 FB, MWBB, MLax, MWrest (1992); FB, MBB (2015) 
Virginia 1993 FB (1993) 
Virginia Tech 1987, 1993 FB, MBB (1987); MWCC (1993) 
Wake Forest 1994 MBB (1994) 
Key: FB=Football, MBB=Men’s Basketball, WBB=Women’s Basketball, MT=Tennis, WT=Women’s Tennis Base=Baseball, 
MS=Men’s Swimming, WS=Women’s Swimming, MG= Men’s Golf, WG=Women’s Golf, Soft=Softball, MCC=Men’s Cross 
Country, WCC=Women’s Cross Country, VB=Volleyball, MLax=Men’s Lacrosse, MWrest=Men’s Wrestling  
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Table 1 shows just how extensively a major rules violation scandal can plague an athletic 
conference. During this time period, thirteen of the fifteen member schools committed some type 
of major rules violation; only Duke and Boston College remained unscathed. Football and men’s 
basketball were the two most penalized sports; of the twenty-three cases, fifteen involved 
football and thirteen involved men’s basketball. This should not come as too big of a surprise 
when considering the large amount of media exposure devoted to these two particular sports. 
However, several “non-revenue generating” sports engaged in significant wrongdoing during this 
time as well, dispelling the common perception that just football and basketball programs take 
unacceptable liberties with NCAA rules and regulations.    
Table 2: Most Popular Violations and NCAA Penalties 
Violation Penalty 
1. Extra benefits (16 cases) 1.  Probation (21 cases) 
2. Impermissible Recruiting (14 cases)             2.  Public Reprimand (21 cases) 
3. Lack of Institutional Control (9 cases)             3.  Compliance Reports (17 cases) 
4. Unethical Conduct (8 cases)             4.  Scholarship Reduction (15 cases) 
5. Improper Financial Aid/ Failure to 
Monitor (tied with 6 cases) 
            5.  Re-Certification (12 cases)  
  
 Table 2 lists the five most frequent types of violations committed by ACC member 
schools and penalties levied by the NCAA Committee on Infractions. In terms of violations, 
extra benefits and impermissible recruiting are clearly the most popular over this time period. 
These two offenses are somewhat related in that it often involves providing athletes with items in 
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excess of their scholarship and stipend, and this practice may include both prospective and 
current athletes. Benefits can range from small amounts of cash or gifts to luxurious items such 
as jewelry, high-end clothing, airfare, fine dining, air travel, or tickets to marquee prizefights. 
Impermissible recruiting may include offering prospective athletes extra benefits, but this term is 
more all-encompassing. Illegally contacting recruits via telephone, email, text messaging, or in 
person as well as being present for “tryouts” or workout sessions with recruits can be classified 
under this umbrella of improper or impermissible recruiting. While extra benefits and recruiting 
violations are often committed by lower-level athletics department officials, the other three 
violations most often cited in the selected NCAA reports (lack of institutional control, unethical 
conduct, and failure to monitor) carry with them an aura of indicting senior management for 
negligent behavior. An allegation of failure to monitor or a general lack of institutional control 
can be construed as an organizational “scarlet letter,” yet this designation does not always yield a 
head coach or athletic director’s dismissal from the college or university.   
 The types of penalties levied by the NCAA were pretty uniform; from a possible twenty-
three cases, twenty-one required probation (1-5 years) and a public reprimand/censure. It appears 
that this form of punishment was the actual report itself, with the NCAA making the change in 
the late 1980s. It bears noting that periodic compliance reports detailing suitable progress being 
made by departments and reductions of scholarships were required in the overwhelming majority 
of the cases studied. Re-certification is essentially an accrediting process undertaken by 
compliant athletic departments every 10 years, but this process may have to be repeated 
following violations. Finally, highly severe penalties decided by the NCAA such as a postseason 
ban or vacating of wins or individual records were present in some cases, six and eight 
respectively. 
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Now What? Next Steps for Programs  
While violations and their successive penalties followed a general pattern at ACC 
programs from 1986 to the present, it is much more difficult to pinpoint a distinct “playbook” 
used by schools following the issuing of these sanctions. Higher education administration and 
intercollegiate athletics are atmospheres rife with high turnover; coaches and athletic directors 
are fired for lackluster performance, take positions at new institutions with the hopes of 
“upgrading” his or her situation for not only financial reasons but also enhancing individual 
reputation, retire, or resign for other reasons. Due to this wide variety of possible changes in 
leadership, the existence of a definite link between the culpable program and the change in head 
coach, athletic director, or even university president is tenuous at best. (Table 2 in the Appendix 
details both senior-level and lower-level administrative change for each case in the 1986-2016 
timeframe).     
The first three cases from this study (Virginia Tech football and men’s basketball, 
Georgia Tech men’s tennis, and North Carolina State men’s basketball) offered examples of 
substantive steps taken by these universities’ athletics departments to prevent future wrongdoing. 
After allegations of improper employment, academic fraud, and extra benefits, Virginia Tech’s 
head football coach and athletic director Bill Dooley and head basketball coach Charles Moir 
resigned from their respective positions. Additionally, university president William Lavery 
resigned shortly after the report detailing violations was released by the NCAA. A similar chain 
of events occurred within Georgia Tech’s tennis program with the swift resignation of the team’s 
head coach and top assistant, and N.C. State’s head men’s basketball coach and athletic director 
Jim Valvano (of 1983 NCAA championship fame) was forced to relinquish his athletic director 
duties in 1989 and resigned as head coach the following year. During the late 1980s the national 
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media began exhaustively chronicling serious abuses occurring in the athletic programs at 
Kentucky, Maryland, and Oklahoma, so the decision to distance themselves from the leaders of 
delinquent programs could be viewed as an effective public relations decision (Thelin, 1996).  
Yet, some of these departed administrators found new positions almost immediately, 
even within the same institution. Dooley was named the next head coach at Wake Forest in 1987, 
Lavery became honorary chancellor and professor of international affairs at Virginia Tech in 
1987, and North Carolina State’s Chancellor Bruce Poulton led the university’s Literacy Systems 
Center in 1989. Starting in 1990, the pattern of institutional response can be best described as 
sporadic: some schools made clean breaks with senior athletic officials (North Carolina football 
in 2010) while others either fled the program for new positions (Miami football in early 1990s) 
or largely stayed intact (Syracuse men’s basketball in late 1980s and currently). Despite the lack 
of meaningful action at some programs, in the majority of cases lower-level participants in 
wrongdoing were quickly dismissed as a direct result of their duties at the university; this 
included not only assistant coaches and members of recruiting staffs but also tutors, academic 
advisors, and operations assistants. To further understand how universities respond to NCAA 
scandals, a more in-depth analysis of the nine cases where “lack of institutional control” 
violations were found is necessary.  
The Neglectful Nine 
 Clemson, Georgia Tech, Louisville, Miami (twice), North Carolina State, Syracuse 
(twice), and Virginia all were hit with “lack of institutional control” violations, but each program 
appeared to try different forms of corrective action. With the exception of N.C. State, no head 
coach, athletic director, or university president at any of these schools either resigned or were 
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fired as a direct result of NCAA findings of rules violations. However, this does not mean that 
senior-level administrators remained at their respective schools. Continuing with the widely held 
description of college athletics as a “dog eat dog” world and how high attrition rates are a fact of 
life, nearly all of the other eight universities experienced significant changes. For example, the 
University of Miami was the sight of two particularly shocking scandals: one included school 
officials fraudulently securing over $200,000 in Pell Grants for athletes and the other involved 
the multi-year exploits of Hurricane “super booster” and Ponzi schemer Nevin Shapiro. For the 
early case, head football coaches Jimmy Johnson and Dennis Erickson left for new positions 
with the NFL while then-current athletic directors became the General Manager of the New 
England Patriots and the Director of Sports for the 1996 Olympics, respectively. Syracuse, 
however, is the notable exception, specifically within its men’s basketball program. Despite two 
major investigations into alleged academic fraud and extra benefits, the program’s head coach 
Jim Boeheim has stayed with the school for over forty five years (forty as head coach). One 
hallmark characteristic of the ACC has been its efforts to expand its conference membership, so 
this adds another wrinkle to the issue of how different institutions handle reports of NCAA 
sanctions. 
Non-Charter Members and History of NCAA Violations 
 Founded in 1953, the ACC consisted of eight original members: Clemson, Duke, 
Maryland (now part of the Big Ten) North Carolina, North Carolina State, South Carolina (now 
part of the SEC), Virginia, and Wake Forest. Over time, the ACC was caught in the nationwide 
whirlwind of conference realignment and expansion. Table 3 displays new members of the ACC 
and their history of violations via conference affiliation at the time of NCAA sanctions. 
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Table 3: Expansion Members and Violations 
School Conference at Time of Violation 
Boston College (2005) No violations committed in time period 
Florida State (1991) ACC (after admission to conference) 
Georgia Tech (1979) ACC (after admission to conference) 
***Louisville (2014) Metro, Conference USA 
***Miami (2004) Independent/Big East, Big East, ACC 
Notre Dame (2013) Independent 
Pittsburgh (2013) Independent 
***Syracuse (2013) Big East, Big East/ACC 
Virginia Tech (2004) Metro/Independent, Metro 
 
Eight of the nine expansion schools committed NCAA violations over the thirty-year 
period analyzed, but three in particular deserve special consideration. With the sanctions around 
Louisville’s misconduct still pending, the decision to admit troubled programs such as Syracuse 
and Miami into the conference is worth discussing. The exploits of Miami’s football program are 
well-documented, but the Hurricanes were highly successful on the field, winning bowl games 
and national championships and producing large amounts of revenue as a member of the Big 
East conference (Hurricanes football was independently affiliated prior to 1990). This success 
made the university a prime target for conference expansion, especially for those conferences 
that wanted nationally competitive football programs. From performance and revenue generating 
standpoints, this was a no-brainer; adding Miami to the ACC would easily achieve the 
conference’s goal of being more than just a “basketball conference.” Yet, in the years following 
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Miami’s admittance to the ACC, their football program has gone 81-57, a sharp contrast to their 
128-29 record in the Big East. The presence of well-established football programs in the ACC 
such as (also non-charter member) Florida State may have contributed to this decline in success, 
but this decision to overlook substantive bad behavior by the Hurricanes athletics department and 
their football team specifically in order to achieve greater conference prestige was a major 
gamble to take in the eyes of reform-minded administrators.   
Furthermore, Syracuse’s recent admission to the ACC was a byproduct of the “original” 
Big East disbanding in 2013. As the vetting process for Syracuse joining the ACC was 
underway, highly publicized events were taking place in the university’s men’s basketball 
program, specifically the eligibility of center Fab Melo. Essentially in 2012 senior officials in the 
basketball program, including the director of operations, conspired to keep Melo academically 
eligible during one of Syracuse’s most successful years with the hopes of a deep March 
tournament run. Academic fraud became one of the charges levied against Syracuse in the 
recently released report of NCAA sanctions, but the events surrounding Melo’s eligibility was 
known to the public at the time of Syracuse’s admission to the ACC.    
Conclusions and Limitations 
 The pattern of violations and sanctions is pretty clear from studying the ACC over a 
thirty-year period. Extra benefits given to recruits and current players and improper recruiting are 
the most often-cited violations in NCAA reports, but lack of institutional control and failure to 
monitor also figure prominently throughout this time frame. Probation and regular compliance 
reports are a couple of the most used sanctions by the NCAA, with postseason bans and vacating 
wins/records issued less frequently. Despite these apparent patterns, institutional responses have 
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much more variation. Using my three-outcome model (change in senior-level administration, 
change in lower-level administration, no change), I found that schools largely vary in how they 
handle NCAA sanctions. Some schools like North Carolina and North Carolina State swiftly 
removed all individuals associated with the alleged wrongdoing while schools like Miami or 
Syracuse either did nothing or underwent administrative change involving coaches or athletic 
directors taking positions elsewhere and facing no disciplinary action for their role in NCAA 
violations. The high rate of attrition often masks this concrete effect of NCAA sanctions on job 
security because most people simply read countless stories of coaches or athletic directors being 
fired or resigning and fail to look deeper. 
 Because this is a case study analysis, there exist potential generalizability concerns. 
Studying the issue of responses to NCAA sanctions through only one conference over one time 
period makes it difficult for researchers to definitively state a connection between sanctions and 
administrative change. However, the ACC is a pretty diverse conference in terms of enrollment, 
geography, and public/private affiliation, so these cases may be better to illustrate the ostensible 
variation among schools than a more homogenous conference such as the SEC or Big 10. 
Additionally, the concept of selective enforcement itself may adversely impact the findings of 
this study because some investigations may not have even taken place, indicating an 
inconsistency of investigating wrongdoing. 
 As a senior-level athletic administrator, I would feel at ease with the results provided. 
Despite the large numbers of cases with administrative change, the number of instances where 
university presidents, athletic directors, and head coaches were either fired or forced to resign 
were relatively rare in this sample. Even after some resignations, senior-level administrators 
were gainfully employed at another institution or another department within the same institution. 
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Those that face the greatest brunt of sanctions however are the student-athletes who are members 
of non-compliant programs and lower-level staffers who may have directly committed the 
violations but whose employment prospects are bleaker than their senior-level counterparts.               
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Appendix 
Table 1: ACC Member Characteristics 
School Location Year 
Established 
Affiliation Undergraduate 
Enrollment 
Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA 1863 Private 
(Catholic) 
14,500 
Clemson Clemson, SC 1889 Public 19,453 
Duke Durham, NC 1838 Private  6,247 
Florida State Tallahassee, FL 1851 Public 41,000 
Georgia Tech Atlanta, GA 1885 Public 19,393 
Louisville Louisville, KY 1798 Public 22,000 
Miami Coral Gables, FL 1925 Private 15,520 
North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 1789 Public 26,878 
North Carolina State Raleigh, NC 1887 Public 29,957 
Notre Dame South Bend, IN 1842 Private 
(Catholic) 
11,985 
Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA 1787 Public 35,330 
Syracuse Syracuse, NY 1870 Private 21,029 
Virginia Charlottesville, VA 1819 Public 20,399 
Virginia Tech Blacksburg, VA 1872 Public 28,000 
Wake Forest  Winston-Salem, NC 1834 Private  7,152 
**Enrollment figures courtesy of school profile pages on http://www.theacc.com/ ** 
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Table 2: Institutional Response Criteria 
School Year Change in Senior-Level Admin Change in Lower-Level Admin 
Clemson 1990, 1992 Y (1990), N (1992) Y (1990), Y (1992) 
Florida State  1996, 2009 Y (1996), Y (2009)  N (1996), Y (2009) 
Georgia Tech 1989, 2005, 2011, 
2014 
Y (1989), Y (2005), Y (2011), N 
(2014)  
Y (1989), N (2005), Y (2011), Y 
(2014) 
Louisville  1996, 1998 Y (1996), N (1998) Y (1996), Y (1998) 
Miami 1995, 2003, 2013 Y (1995), Y (2003), Y (2013) N (1995), N (2003), N (2013) 
North Carolina 2012 Y (2012) Y (2012) 
North Carolina State 1989 Y (1989) N (1989) 
Notre Dame 1999 N (1999) Y (1999) 
Pittsburgh 1993 N (1993) Y (1993) 
Syracuse 1992, 2015 Y (1992), Y (2015) Y (1992), Y (2015) 
Virginia 1993 N (1993) N (1993) 
Virginia Tech 1987, 1993 Y (1987), Y (1993) N (1987), N (1993) 
Wake Forest 1994 N (1994) Y (1994) 
**Note: 16 of 23 cases contained some type of senior-level administrative change; 14 of 23 cases    
contained some type of lower-level administrative change  
